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CIVIL PROCEDURE: ABSENTEE CLASS
MEMBERS SUBJECTED TO DISCOVERY AND
CLAIMS DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO
RESPOND
In Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Insurance Co.,' the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held, Judge Stevens dissenting, that
identifiable but absent members of a class who received notice of the
pendency of the class action, and who failed to respond thereto, may
be subjected to the discovery procedures of the federal rules even to
the extent of having their claims dismissed with prejudice when they
fail to comply with the discovery orders of-the court. 2 A class action
had originally been brought for damages allegedly suffered by some
Midwestern United Life Insurance Co. stockholders as a result of
certain fraudulent securities dealings which had been aided and
abetted by Midwestern.3 On October 12, 1966, the district court had
sent notice' to all known and prospective members of the stockholder
class, including appellants, informing them of the nature of the suit
and of their option to request exclusion from the class represented
by the plaintiff, Mrs. Brennan, or to remain in the class and be
represented either by the representative stockholder's counsel or by
counsel of their own choice. Thereafter, the district court granted the
discovery motions of Midwestern 5 requiring the stockholders to
produce certain documents and records, and to respond to
interrogatories. Compliance with these orders was directed by March
1, 1967. On January 4, 1967, the representative stockholder's counsel
mailed to all class members copies of both the order to produce
documents and the interrogatories, specifically mentioning the March
I deadline. Counsel then sent a letter, on February 20, 1967, to those
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4. Pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2).
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class members who had not yet responded, including appellants,
reminding them of the orders and the deadline. On April 17, 1967,
the district court ordered that the claims of any class member not
responding to the discovery requests within twenty days would be
dismissed with prejudice. Again, on May 4, 1967, the stockholders'
counsel wrote to those class members, including appellants, who had
not yet complied, warning them of the sanction which would be
imposed for continued noncompliance. Finally, on August 17, 1967,
the district court granted Midwestern's motion to dismiss with
prejudice the claims of all class members who had failed to respond
to either the interrogatories or a subsequently entered show-cause
order. When the class action ultimately came to a conclusion nearly
a year later, judgment was entered in favor of the stockholder class.
Appellants then filed a motion to set aside the August 17, 1967 order
dismissing their claims with prejudice. The district court denied that
motion,6 and the Seventh Circuit affirmed.
Prior to adoption of the class action device, compulsory joinder
was the only means by which a large group of plaintiffs could
successfully bring their claims into the federal courts in suits which
were classified as "legal."'7 Mass joinder, however, was an awkward
and unwieldy procedure when the potential group of interested
persons was large, inasmuch as it necessarily presupposed the
prospective plaintiffs advancing on the courts en masse. 8 This
problem was particularly severe when the stake of each member of
the group was inadequate to impel him to accept the burdens involved
in prosecution of a suit.9 As the inadequacy of the mass joinder
procedure became apparent, attention was focused on the
development of a procedural vehicle which would allow mass suit.1"
The result was the class action, which made adjudication of such cases
possible" by allowing representatives of a large group of interested
persons to sue or be sued on behalf of the whole group, thus obviating
the necessity of joining all members.' 2 The class action was originally
provided for in Equity Rule 38, which allowed the use of a class action
where there were common interests within the group, too many
6. - F.2d at -
7. 2 BARRON & HoLTzOFF § 561; 3B MOORE % 23.02, at 23-72.
8. Kalven & Rosenfield 687-9 1.
9. Id.
10. WRIGHT § 72,at306.
I1. 2 BARRON &HoLTZOFF § 561,at254.
12. WRIGHT § 72, at 306.
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interested persons to be brought before the court at one time, and a
representative of the class who would fairly present the case for the
entire group. 13 The principal difference between the Equity Rule 38
class action and the mass joinder rules was the point at which the
plaintiffs were organized: after a favorable judgment in the former,
and before trial in the latter. When the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure were adopted in 1938, an attempt was made to encourage
the expanded use of class actions" by allowing their use in situations
where permissive joinder would be proper, 6 thereby eliminating the
previous rule that class actions were available only in situations which
would have required compulsory joinder. 17 Rule 23 was changed
extensively in 1966. While the same basic requirements of numerosity,
impracticability of joinder, and adequacy of representation were
retained," certain provisions were introduced which strengthened the
effect of judgments in class actions" and made it a more effective
method for obtaining relief for relatively small injuries to large
numbers of persons.20 Of particular significance for present purposes,
the 1966 amendments gave the court broad powers to better
administer class actions.2' Rule 23(d) provides the courts with wide
13. 3B MoORE 23.02, at 23-74.
14. Kalven & Rosenfield 691.
15. The class action was made available for all civil actions, whether formerly denominated
legal or equitable. In the past the class action had been available only in equity cases.
WRIGHT § 72, at 306.
16. Permissive joinder would be proper where the claims for relief of an interested person
arise out of the same transaction or series of transactions as those sued upon, and involve
common questions of law or fact. See FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a).
17. 3BMooP. 23.02-1, at 23-77.
18. Id. at 23-121.
19. It has been recognized that the judgment in a class action represents an exception to
the general rule that, unless one was a party to an action, or was made a party by service of
process, he is not bound by the judgment in the action, although the extent of this exception
remains imprecisely defined. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940). See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95
U.S. 714 (1877); 2 BARRON & HoLrZOFF § 561, at 63, § 572, at 125 (C. Wright & F. Elliott
ed., Supp. 1970).
20. The Advisory Committee Note to Rule 23 states that the availability of class actions
is extended by Rule 23(b)(3), as revised in 1966, to include controversies in which there are
questions of law or fact common to all members of a group, and additionally, that the use of
the class action device would contribute to efficiency in adjudication and uniformity in decisions
affecting large numbers of people. Ford, Federal Rule 23: A Device for Aiding the Small
Claimant, 10 B.C. IND. & COh. L. RaV. 501, 504-07 (1969); Kaplan, Continuing Work of
the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV.
L. Ray. 356,397-98 (1966).
21. Rule 23(d) provided the court with the power to make appropriate orders to determine
the course of proceedings or prescribe measures to promote efficiency in the presefitation of
the case; to require that notice of the course of the proceedings, the extent of the judgment,
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discretion in assuring the fair and efficient adjudication of class
actions.22 Specifically included is the power to require responses from
members of the class to enable the court to effectively define the scope
of, and fairly administer the action.23 Rule 23(d)(1) and (d)(5), for
example, empowers the court to resist the delay and confusion which
tend to occur in any action affecting a large number of persons,u
to determine the sequence of the proceedings, to expedite the
litigation, and to protect the interests of absent class members.,- On
its face, however, the rule places no duty of affirmative action on
absent class members.
The extent to which absent class members may be required to take
affirmative action prior to judgment on the merits is an issue which
has received very little attention.2 6 Although non-present class
members have been required to provide the court with information
concerning the amounts of their claims and the circumstances under
which they arose,27 these requirements have not been imposed either
through the use of discovery procedures or for the purpose of aiding
adverse parties in the preparation of their cases.2 Rather, the
information so acquired has been used by the court to better evaluate
the sufficiency of the representation being provided by the named
plaintiffs, to make possible a more precise definition of the size and
membership of the class than could be obtained otherwise, to
determine whether subclasses should be established, and generally to
and the rights of absentees to enter appearances be given to members of the class; and to impose
conditions on the representative or on intervenors or to require necessary amendment to the
pleadings. The orders may be combined with an order under Rule 16, which provides for
determinations by the court concerning the rules governing the presentation of expert witnesses,
the calendar for the trial, and similar matters, and may be altered as may be desirable. FED.
R. Cir. P. 23(d).
22. 3B MOORE 23.70, at 23-1401.
23. Newberg, Orders in the Conduct of Class Actions: A Consideration of Subdivision (d),
10 B.C. IND. & Corm. L. REv. 577,589 (1969).
24. 3BMooRE 23.71, at 23-1411 to-1412.
25. 2 BARRON & HOLTZOFF § 571 n.79.6; 3B MOOE 23.75, at 23-1475.
26. - F.2d at
27. Iowa v. Union Asphalt & Roadoils, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 391, 403-04 (S.D. Iowa 1968),
affd, 408 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1969); Minnesota v. United States Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559,
577 (D. Minn. 1968); Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452,
459 (E.D. Pa. 1968); Harris v. Jones, 41 F.R.D. 70,74 (D. Utah 1966).
28. See note 27 supra. In all of these cases, the requests were made at a very early stage
in the proceedings, and only basic information, such as the amount claimed and the way in
which the claim arose, was obtained. The concern of the court was to find out the membership
of the class, and whether there were common questions of law or fact present to warrant the
use of the class action device.
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contribute to the fair and efficient adjudication of the case.29 These
purposes are entirely consistent with those set forth in Rule 23(d)30
and are, in fact, essential for the proper maintenance of a class action.
By themselves, however, such purposes provide no basis for subjecting
absent class members to discovery by an adverse party. Even where
absent class members have merely been required to aid the court in
the proper administration of the suit, there is no clear indication that
sanctions have actually been imposed for failure to respond, although
some courts have stated an intention to exclude non-responsive
members from the class3 or to dismiss their claims with prejudice.32
In only one case has a court gone so far as to state that, in addition
to the court's requiring that absent class members return completed
proof-of-claim forms, it would be allowable for the representatives
of the class to request other information from the absentees, as long
as no attempt was made to solicit claims.33 The court did not,
however, announce any sanction for failure to respond.Y Thus,
although some requirements have been imposed upon non-present
class members, they have been primarily for the benefit of the court,
not the antagonists. In no case has the court permitted a party adverse
to the class to request information from absent members of the class.
In the one case in which the representative of the class was allowed
to make requests for information from absentees, sanctions were
neither threatened nor imposed for failure of the absentees to comply.
Thus, it may fairly be stated that courts have been quite reluctant
to require affirmative action from absentee class members.s
In Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Insurance Co., the court
affirmed the district court's denial of appellants' motion to set aside
the dismissal order, relying basically on the cases discussed in the
preceding paragraph, and on a comment made concerning them by
Professor Moore."6 The court held that absent class members who
have received notice of the pendency of the suit may be required to
29. See Harris v. Jones, 41 F.R.D. 70,74-75 (D. Utah 1966).
30. Iowa v. Union Asphalt & Roadoils, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 391, 403-04 (S.D. Iowa 1968);
Harris v. Jones, 41 F.R.D. 70,74-75 (D. Utah 1966); 3B MooRE 23.55, at 23-1161.
31. Iowa v. Union Asphalt & Roadoils, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 391,403-04 (S.D. Iowa 1968);
Minnesota v. United States Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559, 577-78 (D. Minn. 1968); Philadelphia
Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452,459-60 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
32. Harris v. Jones, 41 F.R.D. 70,74-75 (D. Utah 1966).
33. Minnesota v. United States Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559, 577 (D. Minn. 1968).
34. Id.
35. Kom v. Franchard Corp., 50 F.R.D. 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Berman v. Narragansett
Racing Ass'n, 48 F.R.D. 333 (D.R.I. 1969).
36. 3BMooRE 23.55,at23-1161.
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submit to discovery procedures and reveal information which the
court finds to be "necessary or helpful" 37 to the fair presentation and
adjudication of the suit. The discovery must not, however, be used
to harrass the absentees, and they must be fully informed of the
discovery orders and the sanctions for failure to comply.3 The court
stated, in deference to the general policy of Rule 23 giving the absent
class member a "free ride ' 39 as to the conduct of the case prior to
judgment, that absentees should not be subjected to discovery as a
routine matter. Nevertheless, the court took the view that requiring
some discovery from an absent class member is compatible with Rule
23. Because the absent class member and the representative plaintiff
share the same interests with respect to the subject being litigated,
and because the rights and liabilities of the absentee and the
representative will be adjudicated in the representative suit, the court
concluded that the issuance of orders to absent class members
invoking the discovery procedures of Rules 33 and 34 is a proper
exercise of the powers conferred on the court by Rule 23(d) to make
orders in the conduct of class actions.4" The criterion which the court
offers for determining when the use of discovery is proper, however,
is practically indistinguishable from the criteria governing the use of
discovery in other kinds of civil actions. Discovery from an absent
class member is allowable, according to the court, if it is "necessary
or helpful" to the proper presentation and adjudication of the suit.4"
No specific reference is made to any of the subdivisions of Rule
23(d)-in which are listed the several purposes toward which orders
made pursuant to Rule 23(d) should be directed-in order to indicate
which of these purposes the discovery orders in this case were
calculated to achieve. In any event, none of the provisions of Rule
23(d) seem to bear a significant relationship to the matter of discovery
by the defendant from an absent class member affecting the substance
of the case; the purposes for which the court may make "appropriate
orders"42 under Rule 23(d) deal only with maintaining the integrity
of the suit as a class action. Also, the court mentions that the record
did not reveal any attempt on the part of Midwestern to use discovery
procedures to take advantage of class members or as a tactic to
37. - F.2d at
38. Id. at .
39. Id. at..
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d). See note 21 supra.
1012 [Vol. 1971:1007
RULE 23 DISCOVERY
discourage claimants. But, again, this does not distinguish the scope
of discovery procedures available against a party in an ordinary civil
action from the scope of discovery available against an absent
member of a class in a class action. Protection is afforded to all
persons subject to discovery by the discovery rules themselves. 43 The
dissent argued that the appellants could not properly be considered
part of the stockholder class represented by Mrs. Brennan because
their interests were somewhat antagonistic to those of the other
members of the class by virtue of their unwillingness or inability to
respond to the interrogatories. Since the representative may litigate
the interests of absentees only to the extent that their interests are
genuinely and thoroughly congruous, 4 the fact that their interests
were divergent would have resulted in their exclusion from the class,
and placed them outside any judgment rendered in the representative
suit.,,
Brennan is troublesome in several respects. There is literally no
case precedent for requiring absent class members to submit to
discovery by an adverse party; all but one of the cases relied upon
by the court limited the requirement of affirmative action on the part
of absentees to providing the court itself with information essential
to the proper administration of the suit." In the remaining case, it
was the representative of the class, not an adverse party, who was
allowed to request information from the absentees, and the court did
not indicate an intention to enforce compliance with those requests
through its sanction power.47 Further, the Brennan court did not
specifically explain how its decision could be reconciled with Rule
23. The court acknowledged the general principle that absentees stand
outside the suit prior to judgment,"' but failed to show convincingly
that any provision of the rule validates the exception to that principle
which its holding represents. 9 In addition to the tenuous support in
43. 2A BARRON & HOLTZOFF § 715, at 231; ,VRiG-T § 83, at 369; Newberg, supra note
23, at 580.
44. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32,44 (1940).
45. - F.2d at
46. These cases are citedat note 27 supra.
47. Minnesota v. United States Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559,577 (D. Minn. 1968).
48. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
49. Professor Moore, in stating that the court may impose requirements of affirmative
action on absentees, refers to the same cases relied on by the court and discussed at notes 31-
35 supra. As has been pointed out, in all of these cases the court used its sanction power only
upon those requests made to obtain information related to the purposes of Rule 23(d), involving
the administration of the suit, and not for discovery by an adverse party which would directly
aid in the presentation of his case. 3B MOORE % 23.55, at 23-1161.
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case precedent and the language of Rule 23, the proposition that
absent class members may be subjected to discovery on a scale
approximately the same as parties to other kinds of civil actions
diverges sharply from the traditional concept of the class action.
Certainly the most distinctive characteristic of the class action is its
representative nature. One or more members of the class sue or are
sued on behalf of the whole class; by hypothesis, all members of the
class are not before the court, and all are not called upon to conduct
or defend the suit. This is the duty only of the representative.
Although the Brennan court said that discovery procedures, as
applied to absentees, are to be closely supervised by the court, the
standard adopted for determining when such procedures would be
proper is so broad that it can fairly be concluded that discovery
procedures may be rather extensively used against absentees.
Similarly, while the court stated that absentees should not be
subjected to discovery to the same extent as parties to other kinds
of civil suits, the standard adopted to govern the use of discovery
against absentees is not itself limited by any such qualification. The
failure of the court to circumscribe the availabity of discovery against
absentees thus creates a potential threat to the integrity of the class
action, since it implies that the absentees are at least to some extent
to be treated as parties before the court, just as is the representative.
Finally, the decision represents a serious departure from one of the
policies underlying the Rule 23 class action, namely that of creating
a procedural device which will be genuinely effective in providing
recovery to large groups of claimants whose individual stakes in the
controversy are too small to support individual suits.50 To be effective
in this respect, it is essential that the expenditure of time and effort
required of each claimant for participation in the recovery be held
to a minimum. If the requirements are made too burdensome, this
purpose will be frustrated, as potential class members will decide that
meeting the requirements for participation in the recovery is not worth
the trouble in light of the small size of the individual claims. It could
well be that the refusal of appellants to respond to the interrogatories
in this case was unreasonable; perhaps only a few pieces of easily
50. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 560 (2d Cir. 1968); Kaplan, A Prefatory
Note, 10 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 497 (1969); Starrs, The Consumer Class Action, 49 B.U.L.
REv. 211, 407 (1969) (Parts I & ii). Cf. Matthies v. Seymour Mfg. Co., 23 F.R.D. 64, 74-75
(D. Conn. 1958).
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obtainable information were requested.51 But even a moderate increase
in the burden of participating in a class action can be expected to
discourage some claimants, and to the extent that this occurs, one
important purpose of the class action will be compromised. The
Seventh Circuit has possibly served notice on all present and
prospective class action defendants that they now have the means to
reduce the size of the class through use of the discovery process.
51. To the extent that the need for the information is thought to outweigh the burden on
absentee members, this may constitute grounds for excluding such members from the class.
See note 44 supra and accompanying text.

